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A B S T R A C T
This work addresses the conceptual design of a submerged nuclear power plant, where a horizontal cylindrical
hull, placed on the floor of a sea or an artificial lake, hosts an integral pressurized Small Modular Reactor (SMR).
A scaled version of the International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS) that matches the requirements of the
submerged containment is here proposed, providing a preliminary sizing of the primary components. Based on
the presence of a large water reservoir (sea or lake) acting as a permanent heat sink, a basic fully passive safety
strategy has been developed and its principles have been investigated, by means of the numerical simulation
of a Station Black-Out (SBO) scenario. The outcomes show that natural circulation flows in the primary circuit
and in the Emergency Heat Removal System (EHRS) can provide a very effective heat transfer capability from
the fuel rods to the external water. The submerged reactor design owns very interesting safety features, which
inherently prevent from the Fukushima-like scenarios, i.e. Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a Loss of Ultimate
Heat Sink(LUHS), thus representing a noticeable improvement for a next generation nuclear reactor. However,
some critical issues for the deployment of such a concept are also identified and briefly discussed.
1. Introduction
Emergency cooling during Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident failed
because of the loss of on-site/off-site electrical power and the con-
sequent lack of a heat sink. The accident has emphasized that cur-
rent nuclear power plants may show strong difficulties in facing pro-
longed Station Black-Out (SBO) scenarios. The response of nuclear in-
dustry to this event included a renovated attention to the develop-
ment of passive safety systems for new designs (International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2016a). Passive systems own the potential to improve
the safety of nuclear power plants, as well as to simplify the layout
and to reduce the costs. After Fukushima, guaranteeing an adequate
core cooling through natural circulation for a very long grace period,
without electrical input or human intervention, has become an impor-
tant feature for the safety strategy of some Gen III + designs. During
the last three decades, those requirements have stimulated large efforts
among researchers in nuclear thermal-hydraulics, aimed at understand-
ing the physics and predicting the transient evolution of natural circu-
lation and multiphase flow. These efforts are currently going on to sup-
port the design of safer, cheaper and sustainable nuclear reactors. Sub
merged Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) can potentially address this
challenge. Nowadays they are mainly at conceptual design level, but
their development could provide a great technological advancement in
the nuclear industry. Those nuclear reactors operate in a containment
moored on the floor of a sea or an artificial lake (Fig. 1) and the power
generated is transferred to the land. This concept offers unique safety
features in terms of enhanced protection towards Fukushima-like acci-
dent scenarios, i.e., Loss Of Off-site Power (LOOP) and Loss of Ultimate
Heat Sink (LUHS), as well as other critical scenarios, including Loss Of
Coolant Accident (LOCA), and external events, e.g., flooding, tsunami
and malevolent human actions.
In the framework of the development of innovative reactor designs,
the submerged SMR concept has obtained a certain attention in recent
years. Early projects were presented by Electric Boat (General Dynamics
Electric Boat Division, 1971) and Herring (1993) in the 1970's and
1990's respectively. The recent progress in subsea oil&gas technologies,
in submarine cables for offshore renewables and in shipbuilding tech-
niques, makes offshore power reactors more feasible today than be-
fore, with an increasing interest towards this option (Buongiorno et al.,
2016).
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Fig. 1. Concept of a submerged SMR
In 2014, the French company DCNS (now Naval Group) presented
the Flexblue concept (Haratyk et al., 2014), a subsea and fully trans-
portable modular power unit that supplies 160 MW⁠el to the grid via sub-
marine cables. Flexblue adopted pressurized water reactor technology
and the projects was aimed at implementing several enhanced passive
safety features, to exploit the seawater as a permanent heat sink and en-
sure an unlimited grace period in case of accident. In addition, Flexblue
can offer other advantages in terms of manufacturing and possibility to
reach isolated sites. Some analyses about core design and safety strat-
egy of Flexblue are available in open literature (Ingremeau and Cordiez,
2015) (Santinello et al., 2017a) (Haratyk and Gourmel, 2015) (Gourmel
et al., 2016), but important issues concerning the reactor design and
safety systems are still under development. In particular, although pres-
surized water is undoubtedly the most reliable technology for such a
concept, Flexblue still does not present a final reactor layout. Two so-
lutions were under consideration, but a thorough investigation about
their capability to achieve design and safety targets has not yet been
addressed. As a first option, DCNS used a VVER-type design for pre-
liminary safety analyses (Haratyk and Gourmel, 2015) (Gourmel et al.,
2016). Thanks to the horizontal U-tube Steam Generator (SG), the to-
tal height of the reactor does not exceed the diameter of Flexblue hull
(14m), but such solution does not provide compactness to the primary
system. Moreover, the horizontal layout of the SGs does not facilitate
a natural circulation regime during emergency cooling. A second op-
tion proposed by CEA is the SCOR-F concept (NUSMoR, 2014), a re-
duced power version of the 600 MW⁠el Simple COmpact Reactor (SCOR).
It consists of a pressurized reactor with a vertical U-tube steam genera-
tor placed right on top of the core. This layout seems not suitable to min-
imize the global height of the reactor and to fit the containment. A work
by Shirvan et al. (2016) examined five nuclear technologies in relation
to their adaptability for an offshore underwater SMR: Lead-Bismuth Fast
Reactor (LBFR), Organic Cooled Reactor (OCR), Superheated Water Re-
actor (SWR), Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) and integral PWR. They con-
cluded that all these technologies are good for a fully passive safety
strategy. However, LBFR and OCR, which are identified as the most suit-
able technologies, can rely on a very little experience in civil nuclear
industry, therefore achieving a complete reactor design and meeting the
requirement of safety authorities would be very difficult and not feasi-
ble in the short-medium term.
The present work introduces the concept of an integral PWR (iPWR)
SMR, suitable to operate in a submerged containment and based on
a scaled version of the International Reactor Innovative and Secure
(IRIS) (Carelli et al., 2004) (Petrovic et al., 2012). IRIS is an integral,
modular, medium size (335 MW⁠el) PWR, based on passive safety sys-
tems and a pressure suppression, steel containment. The new proposal
is aimed at obtaining a reactor layout able to satisfy design and lay-
out constraints as well as safety requirements. The primary compo-
nents have been revisited in order to reduce the electrical output to
160 MW⁠el and the reactor height below 14m (Section 2), providing a
preliminary sizing and thus letting define a basic safety strategy (Sec-
tion 3). Then, the resulting preliminary design has been tested in a nu-
merical simulation of a SBO scenario (Section 4), where the secondary
side of the steam generator is connected to an emergency condenser im-
mersed in the external seawater. The simulations put on evidence the
potentiality that such conceptual design can offer in term of enhanced
safety features. However, many challenges about the deployment of a
submerged SMR still remain open: these are identified and briefly dis-
cussed in Section 5.
2. Revisited reactor layout: IRIS-160
2.1. Overview
Scaling the IRIS design is not a new operation: in 2009 Petrovic et
al. (2009) proposed the concept of IRIS-50, a reduced power (50 MW⁠el)
version of the reference IRIS design, conceived to better address cogen-
eration purposes and to supply electricity to remote or isolated areas.
However, in the present case the constraints and the requirements are
considerably different. The primary limitation for the design of a sub-
merged SMR is given by the diameter of the horizontal cylindrical con-
tainment. Based on construction capacity and feasibility end econom-
ics considerations, DCNS proposed a 14-m diameter hull (Haratyk et al.,
2014) for the Flexblue case. That value is assumed as reference for this
work. Another constraint is the heat transfer capability of the hull dur-
ing emergency operation, which identifies the power output of the re-
actor. Santinello et al. (2017a) investigated that capability with a CFD
study and found that the decay power of a 500 MW⁠th (roughly 160
MW⁠el) reactor could be rejected through the containment. Thus, that
value is assumed for a scaled IRIS-160 version. Reactor scaling mainly
consists of revisiting the design of primary components, i.e. reactor core,
control rods driving mechanism, steam generator, primary pumps and
pressurizer.
2.2. Reactor core
Reactor core design considers a standard PWR fuel assembly as
adopted in IRIS: a configuration made of 89 fuel assemblies with 264
fuel rods in a 17×17 square array. The resulting diameter of the core is
around 2.75m. The active height of the fuel elements has been scaled
down to reduce the power output: the active height of IRIS-160 fuel
element must be roughly halved with respect to the 4.20m fuel as-
sembly height adopted in IRIS. Among the current or proposed offer
of fuel elements, some products seem to be suitable for the purpose,
e.g. Framatome, Lo-Lopar, M-Power and Westinghouse SMR, all with
active height around 2.5m (Nuclear Engineering International (NEI),
2014). The active height of NuScale and Smart reactors is 2m and
CAREM-25 adopts 1.4m height elements (International Atomic Energy
Agency, 2016b), although these reactors are designed with power out-
put smaller than IRIS-160. In principle, a 2-m value for the fuel assem-
bly active height can be reasonably assumed. Considering gas plenum
and core support plates, the overall height of IRIS-160 core would be
in the range of 3.00–3.20m. Albeit neutronic verification must be per-
formed to assess the of such a core, the solution seems feasible.
2.3. Control rods driving mechanism
An integral reactor allows placing the Control Rods Driving Mech-
anism (CRDM) inside the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). This carries
two advantages: (i) the rod ejection accident is eliminated by design,
because there is no differential pressure to drive out the CRDM exten-
sion shafts; (ii) there are no nozzle penetrations on the upper head of
the RPV. In IRIS design, the CRDM was placed above the core and ac-
tuated with electromagnetic or hydraulic mechanism. For IRIS-160, a
similar approach is maintained. The height of the CRDM is roughly
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trol rods and the drive line, plus the height of the handling mechanism.
The overall height can be estimated between 5.5 and 6.0m.
2.4. Steam generator
The Steam Generator (SG) design for IRIS-160 has undergone large
modifications with respect to the IRIS original design. In IRIS, eight he-
lical coil SG modules were placed around the barrel, with module di-
ameter equal to 1.5m. Such solution is not feasible for IRIS-160: due to
the reactor size reduction, for economic reasons it is desirable to reduce
also the vessel diameter. Therefore, a layout with two or four helical SG
modules co-axial to the barrel is proposed. Two constraints have been
imposed: a restriction on the length of each helical tube of 32m (due to
manufacturing reasons, same for IRIS) and the SG module height, lim-
ited to 4m since there must be room for headers and pumps within the
limit of the CRDMs clearance. For a preliminary design, the same tube
diameter and pitches adopted in IRIS have been maintained. Main geo-
metrical parameters are given in Table 1. The resulting SG module outer
diameter as a function of the number of tube rows is given in Fig. 2. For
each number of rows and depending on the number of modules, the op-
timized average length of tubes has been calculated.
The preliminary sizing has been performed with a Lumped Parame-
ter Approach (LPA) and then verified with a Relap5 simulation. Two
configurations, i.e. 2 SG modules (4 headers) and 4 SG modules (8 head-
ers), have been considered. The sizing calculations aim at determining
the heat exchange surface, and consequently the number of tubes and
rows, needed to transfer the thermal power (500 MW⁠th) from the pri-
mary to the secondary side. LPA employs energy balances, Newton's
law of cooling and empirical correlations for heat transfer coefficients.
Primary fluid flows down across the tube bundle, while steam is pro-
duced and superheated inside the helically coiled tubes. Since the ther-
mal power of the scaled version is roughly halved with respect to stan-
dard IRIS value, on the primary side two options are possible: the SG
inlet specific enthalpy and (a) the SG outlet specific enthalpy, or al-
ternatively (b) the total mass flow rate can be maintained equal to
those adopted in IRIS. Consequently, suitable outlet values satisfying the
energy balance must be taken for (a) the total mass flow rate or (b)
for the outlet specific enthalpy, respectively. The advantage of choice
(a) is a dramatic reduction of pressure losses on the primary side due
Table 1
SG geometrical parameters.




Barrel outer diameter ⁠a 2.85m
a Corresponding to SG module inner diameter.
Fig. 2. SG diameter given the number of rows.
to the decrease of the total mass flow rate, while choice (b) represents
the best solution to maximize the temperature difference between pri-
mary and secondary fluid and therefore to enhance the heat transfer
process. Both alternatives are analyzed. As far as secondary side flow
rate is concerned, it has been reduced in order to obtain superheated
steam at outlet, with the same specific enthalpy of the standard IRIS.
The same primary and secondary operating pressures of IRIS, i.e. 15.5
and 6.2MPa respectively, have been considered.
To take into account the different heat transfer regimes of secondary
side two-phase flow, the tube has been divided into four zones: (i)
subcooled liquid, (ii) bulk boiling, (iii) CHF and post dryout, (iv) su-
perheated steam. The heat transfer problem in each zone is solved by
means of the electrical analogy, considering primary and secondary con-
vective resistances, plus the conductive resistance for cylindrical geom-
etry accounting for the tube wall. Based on Newton's law of cooling, the
following system can be written for each zone:
(1)
The subscripts I and II denote the primary and the secondary side re-
spectively. D⁠in and D⁠out are tube inner and outer diameters. T⁠w is the
wall temperature and T⁠b is the bulk temperature of the fluid. Its deter-
mination has been derived from the enthalpy jumps in each zone, which
can be obtained from the information on the secondary side provided
the quality at dry-out with a specific correlation (saturation minus in-
let enthalpy for zone (i), dryout minus saturation enthalpy for zone (ii)
etc). k α R denotes the thermal resistances (convective and conductive
for cylindrical geometry). To determine α the Heat Transfer Coefficient
(HTC) on the primary side and in the four secondary side zones, suitable
empirical correlations have been used, as reported in Table 2. Correla-
tions used for zone (ii), (iii) and (iv) are not validated for helical geom-
etry, but these have been used anyway because of the lack of specific
correlations in open literature.
The system in eq. (1) has been solved for each zone with a Matlab
routine. An iterative procedure was applied, because of the presence of
non-linear terms. Then, the energy balance in eq. (2) provides the value
of the total length L of the jth zone:
(2)
Table 2
Empirical correlations used to determine HTCs.
Primary side Secondary side
All zones – Zukauskas (Žukauskas,
1987) correlation for heat transfer
coefficient of single-phase fluid in cross
flow over a bank of tubes.
Zone (i) – ESDU (ESDU, 2001)
correlation for single phase heat
transfer in curved tubes.
Zone (ii) – Chen (Chen, 1966)
correlation for heat transfer of two-
phase turbulent steady flow.
Zone (iii) – Groeneveld
(Groeneveld, 1973) correlation for
heat transfer in post dry-out zone.
Zone (iv) – Hadaller and Banerjee
(Hadhaller and Banerjee, 1969)
correlation for heat transfer to
superheated steam.
Critical Heat Flux – Ruffel (Ruffel,
1974) correlation to predict dryout
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The term is the secondary flowrate divided by the total number of
tubes, which depends also on the number of rows, and ΔhjII is the in-
crease of fluid specific enthalpy in the jth zone. The results for the two
cases simulated (two and four SG modules) are reported in Fig. 3. The
graphics show the length of SG tubes needed to transfer the whole ther-
mal power for number of rows between 30 and 65. The SG is considered
feasible if this value is lower than the available average length of the
tubes, which slightly varies with the number of rows. Calculations with
total or half primary flowrate, with respect to IRIS operating value, are
also shown. LPA calculations reveal that, in principle, the outer diam-
eter of the helical SG module can be lower than 5m. Hence, it will be
possible to define a suitable value for the primary flowrate, which opti-
mize the RPV diameter and the head of primary pumps.
The results of the LPA have been verified with 1D system code analy-
sis, using Relap5 system code and benchmarking versions Mod3.2 and
Mod3.3. A SG with 45 rows and 5m diameter has been modeled. The
Relap5 simulations adopt the same operating and boundary conditions
of the LPA calculations. The model does not consider the curvature of
the tubes, since Relap5 does not include correlations for helical geome-
try. Quite good qualitative agreement between LPA and 1D approaches
has been found (Fig. 4), although discrepancies between predictions of
Mod 3.2 and Mod 3.3 will require further detailed investigations. The
preliminary analysis provides reasonable evidence that the layout of the
SG can be suitable for the concept of the IRIS-160, with a RPV internal
diameter lower than 5m.
2.5. Primary pumps
For the IRIS-160 the use of four axial spool-type pumps has been as-
sumed. Pumps would be placed above the SG modules, in the annulus
between the barrel and the RPV. In the 4 SG modules - 8 headers con-
figuration, each pump is positioned between two upper headers. Overall
dimensions of pump and diffuser is below 1.5m height, 1m width and
1m depth. At this preliminary stage, no pump model is chosen.
2.6. Pressurizer
The IRIS pressurizer (Barroso et al., 2003) was integrated into the
upper head of the RPV. The pressurizer region is defined by an in-
sulated, inverted top-hat structure that divides the circulating reactor
coolant flow path from the saturated pressurizer water. The total vol-
ume available is much larger in comparison with typical PWR design
(1.6 times larger than AP1000 pressurizer). Thus, IRIS did not require
sprayers, whose implementation in an integral configuration would
be challenging. The IRIS-160 preliminary pressurizer design has been
made keeping the same volume/power ratio of IRIS: basically, IRIS-160
needs half the pressurizer volume of IRIS. Anyway, to reduce the total
height of the reactor, the shape of the dome is not spherical, but ellip-
soidal. With this configuration, the necessary volume for the pressurizer
(roughly 40m⁠3) can be obtained with an elliptic dome with 4.7m base
diameter and less than 2m height.
2.7. Layout
The assembly of the primary components is shown in Fig. 5. The
total height of the integral RPV has been estimated and in principle it
seems possible to keep it below 13m. Similarly, the integral layout has
also the potential to keep the RPV diameter below 5m. Table 3 shows
the details of height and diameter calculations. Final design sizes de-
pend on the definition of operating flowrate and on safety considera-
tions.
3. Basic safety strategy
The safety target for the submerged SMR concept is to implement,
for decay heat removal operations, a fully passive safety approach,
which does not require AC power or human interventions and can rely
on the water surrounding the containment as a permanent and infi-
nite heat sink. The achievement of this goal would practically allow
eliminating the Fukushima-like accident scenarios. Scientific-based ar-
guments are needed to assess that passive safety systems are well de-
signed and can ensure the safe cooling of the fuel rods for an indefinitely
long grace period.
The most promising set of safety systems refers to: (i) two (or four,
to be defined by PSA considerations) trains of Emergency Heat Re-
moval Systems (EHRS), i.e. two-phase flow natural circulation loops,
each one connecting one in-vessel helical-coil SG module to two ex-hull
condensers; (ii) a pressure suppression pool (safety tank), with direct in-
jection lines to the RPV and to the reactor containment; (iii) the reactor
containment (dry-well), which offers steam condensation capability on
the metal surface in contact with the external water, (iv) two trains of
in-pool heat exchangers/condensers, directly connected to the integral
RPV.
The safety procedure adopts, in an “intact primary” (non-LOCA)
scenario: (a) the suppression pools, to depressurize the primary sys-
tem + (b) the passive EHRS, to reject the decay heat to the infinite
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Fig. 4. Temperature profiles of the scaled SG at 15.5/6.2MPa and 2250kg/s, predicted by Relap5 Mod3.2 (a) and Mod3.3 (b), and compared with LPA approach.
heat sink (sea or lake) or (c) in-pool heat exchangers, to reject the decay
heat to the suppression pool.
In a “non-intact primary” (LOCA-like) scenario: (a) + (d) direct in-
jection lines to the integral RPV and to the dry-well + (e) flooding of
the dry-well section of the hull and condensation on the inner wall of
the containment.
The two safety strategies are sketched in Fig. 6. Thanks to the inte-
gral layout, the large break LOCA accident is prevented by design, there-
fore the “non-intact primary” scenario refers only to small break LOCAs,
e.g., in case of rupture of a Direct Vessel Injection line.
According to a Fukushima-like scenario, the reference accident is
only the Station Black-Out (SBO), since the concurrent Loss of Ultimate
Heat Sink (LUHS) is assumed as practically impossible. Hence the spe-
cific accident scenarios to be investigated have been selected according
to one single criterion: the integrity (or not) of the primary circuit. In
case of an “intact primary” (non-LOCA-SBO) accident, the EHRS is the
key passive safety system, while for a “non-intact primary” (LOCA-SBO)
scenario, the hull or submerged containment plays the main role. The
latter represents also a backup strategy in case of failure of other safety
systems. The entire safety strategy relies on the demonstration that this
process can be effective also months/years after the reactor scram, when
decay power is very low. Santinello et al. (Santinello et al., 2017b) have
studied the long-term cooling scenario after a LOCA through the sub-
merged containment with a numerical analysis, showing the good re-
sponse of the system.
4. Simulation of a Station Black-Out scenario
Station Black-Out event (SBO) occurs in case of complete failure of
both off-site and on-site AC power sources. In this scenario, decay heat
can be transferred both to in-pool and ex-hull heat exchanger. In-pool
heat exchanger works in a protected environment, while the ex-hull
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Fig. 5. Assembly (a) and components (b) of IRIS-160 reactor layout.
Table 3
Summary of estimated lengths and diameters of primary components.












Total height ≈ 12.40–12.70m
ever, direct seawater heat transfer is more effective, since the tempera-
ture of the seawater is constant throughout the whole transient.
A numerical investigation of SBO scenario has been performed with
Relap5-Mod3.3. In the simulation case, after the reactor scram decay
heat removal is demanded only to the EHRS, i.e., the natural circula-
tion loop connecting the integral SG module with the ex-hull condenser
in direct contact with seawater. The RELAP5 model, set up also by ex-
ploiting the experience of a previous work (Ricotti et al., 2002), consists
of: (i) the primary circuit, which includes the core, the pressurizer, the
primary side of the SG and other minor components; (ii) the secondary
circuit, which includes the secondary side of the SG, the EHRS exchang-
ing directly with seawater, a water tank and connecting piping. (Fig. 7).
As in paragraph 2.4, the model does not consider the helical geometry
of the SG.
The seawater surrounding the condenser has not been simulated,
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Fig. 6. Principles of safety strategy for intact (a) and non-intact (b) primary system scenarios (dimensions are not representative).
surface of the condenser. External HTC has been calculated for sin-
gle-phase natural circulation with Churchill & Chu correlation
(Churchill and Chu, 1975) from horizontal tubes. If tube surface temper-
ature is 5°C higher than saturation temperature of seawater, HTC has
been calculated with Palen correlation (Palen et al., 1972) for nucleate
boiling heat transfer from a horizontal tube bundle. Seawater at 20°C
and 0.6MPa has been considered. The power source in the core has a
total initial value of 500 MW⁠th and it has a cosine-shape axial distrib-
ution. After 1500s of nominal operation, SBO occurs: pumps stop op-
erating, pressurizer control is disabled, and some trip valves isolate the
turbine sector and connect the SG secondary side to the EHRS. Reac-
tor is scrammed, and power generation follows the decay curve. Natural
circulation flows are established in primary and secondary loops and a
5-hour-long transient has been simulated.
Relap5-Mod3.3 simulation predicts that the nominal configuration
can remove the decay power from the core (Fig. 8). Natural circulation
flows transfer the decay heat to the seawater without risks of primary
coolant overheating and core uncovering (Fig. 9). Results provide a pre-
liminary verification of the working principle of the EHRS and show
the great potentialities of passive safety systems exploiting a heat sink
at constant temperature. Thermal power rejected to the exterior is al-
ways greater than decay heat and after about 6000s the heat flow be-
comes higher at the seawater condenser than at the SG. This means that
in that period the secondary circuit is accumulating heat. During this pe-
riod the quality at the outlet of the SG is around steam saturation (Fig.
10), while it decreases in the following parts of the transient. For an in-
definitely long time, thermal equilibrium would be reached. The pres-
sure curves shown in Fig. 11 have a monotonic decreasing trend. At the
end of the simulation time, the pressure decreases to very low values.
This is probably due to the effect of the very cold heat sink and, if ver-
ified, it could allow avoiding the need to actuate an Automatic Depres-
surization System (ADS) for this type of scenario. ADS would anyway
operate in case of failure of the EHRS.
5. Challenges for submerged SMRs deployment
To achieve the final design, licensing and commercialization of sub-
merged SMRs, some critical issues still require to be addresses. Main is-
sues include (i) design of a boron free core, (ii) remote operating and
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Fig. 7. Relap5 modeling of primary and secondary sides.
Fig. 8. Comparison among power in core, SG and EHRS.
Fig. 9. Collapsed liquid level in core barrel (zero is the base of active core).
international regulation, (vi) economic sustainability, (vii) public accep-
tance.
(i) Design of a boron free core. The use of soluble boron in a sub-
merged SMR has been discussed by Ingremeau and Cordiez for
the Flexblue case (Ingremeau and Cordiez, 2015). They observed
Fig. 10. Primary and secondary pressure.
Fig. 11. Steam quality at SG inlet and outlet.
that the recycling system of borated water is voluminous and re-
quires frequent maintenance. Therefore, it cannot be suitable for
an underwater reactor, where the available space is limited, and
maintenance cycles must be quite long. They noticed also that a
design based on boron control can lead to criticality in case of a
severe scenario with seawater flooding the reactor compartment,
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boron free core needs to define an accurate strategy to safely man-
age the cold shutdown, the control rod ejection and other type of
reactivity accidents, the Xenon stability, the load following and
the reactivity swing.
(ii) Remote operating and control. A sea-based SMR operating few kilo-
meters far from the shore would need a remote-control system.
The distance between the reactor site and the control room is
much larger than in conventional power plants and the control
system would require more components and cables. There are
more variables that can cause the damage/failure of the system
and disturb the control operations. To ensure the reliability of
remote control operations, ad-hoc I&C systems need to be de-
veloped and tested. Anyway, an important work has been per-
formed by DCNS for the Flexblue reactor. The nominal commu-
nication system in Flexblue is through submarine cables. Emer-
gency system works via radio links, and ultimately via an acoustic
link. This strategy is based on a diversification principle. How-
ever, the use of wireless I&C equipment is still considered less reli-
able than cable technology and more exposed to security breaches
(Internationl Atomic Energy Agency, 2017).
(iii) Refueling and maintenance. Flexblue designers stated that the sub-
merged power unit has no staff on board during operation, but it
is accessible via submarine vehicles and the containment is pro-
vided with access hatches, so that light maintenance and inspec-
tion can be performed onboard while on the seafloor (Haratyk et
al., 2014). However, the position of the hull on the seafloor is
challenging with respect to the access to the reactor for ordinary
maintenance: the feasibility of all routine operations with automa-
tized systems should be verified. Refueling and large maintenance
operations would need to be done in factory, moving the reactor
from the site and then extending the stop period. This could be
solved in principle by assuming a replacement of the whole re-
actor module, in case of heavy maintenance. Given that mainte-
nance operations are burdensome, it would be very important to
define maintenance strategies in strict correlation with advanced
on-line monitoring systems and assess the reliability of the system
and predict incipient failure conditions. A review of current tech-
nologies for this purpose is given by Coble et al. (2012).
(iv) Seismic assessment. To prevent from the seismic risk, a submerged
SMR needs to be isolated from the seafloor and isolation sys-
tems specific for a marine application must be designed. Kim et
al. (2014) studied the case of an offshore reactor operating on
a Gravity-Based Structure (GBS) and introduced a base isolation
system to reduce acceleration by adjusting the total weight of the
GBS. The study is very interesting, since it addresses the seismic
issue of an offshore reactor. However, the case of a submerged
SMR moored on the seabed, like Flexblue, has peculiar features
that require not only structural investigations of the reactor and
isolation from the ground, but also geological analyses of the site.
One of the main concern in case of a submarine earthquake is the
stability of the seabed. The choice of the site would require the
accurate analysis of the composition of the soil and its response in
case of seismic event.
(v) Licensing procedures. Currently, little or no experience about the
licensing of offshore SMRs is owned by the nuclear industry.
The main reference on this field is the floating barge KLT-40,
which is under construction in Russia (Kuznetsov, 2012). In al-
most all countries, licensing regulation has been developed for
large power plants, therefore procedures still need to be adapted
to SMRs (Ramana et al., 2013). An important effort is under way
at IAEA level: the SMR Regulator's Forum has been established
in 2015 (http://www-ns.iaea.org/t). Moreover, within the World
Nuclear Association, the CORDEL Working Group in 2013 es-
tablished the Small Modular Reactor Ad-hoc Group (SMRAG), to
elaborate a path towards harmonized and well-regulated global
SMR deployment (Cooperation in Reactor Design Evaluation and
Licensing (CORDEL) Working Group, 2015). Finally, a reference
work on SMR licensing issues was authored by Soderholm et al.
(Söderholm et al., 2014).
(vi) International regulation. Recently, IAEA (Internationl Atomic
Energy Agency, 2013) developed a preliminary study about this
topic. The analysis addressed several challenges of the deploy-
ment of transportable nuclear power plant from the viewpoints of
legal issues. These challenges include: nuclear safety, radioprotec-
tion, security, safeguards, liability. Within this context, for sub-
merged SMRs the transportation of the nuclear power plant con-
taining fissile material and irradiated fuel represents a key chal-
lenge and it is not fully addressed yet in international regulation.
(vii) Economic sustainability. The economic sustainability of submerged
SMR concept is not differential with respect to on-shore SMR de-
signs, since it relies as well on modular investment and on the pos-
sibility to build the reactor in factory and not on site. However,
O&M costs for submerged SMRs could be considerably higher
than for conventional on-shore nuclear power plants, especially
for the deployment of the first power units. Haratyk et al. (2014)
estimated 100 €/MWh as targeted energy cost for Flexblue. This
price is high if compared with larger nuclear and fossil fuel plants,
but can become competitive in some niches of the energy market,
e.g. in zones where there are energy needs but the land is scarce,
isolated or not suitable for the construction of a power plant.
(viii) Public acceptance. The presence of strong emotional and ethi-
cal concerns in non-expert population has always characterized
the debate about the peaceful uses of nuclear power. Although
the “submerged concept” represents an undeniable advantage for
safety strategy and mitigation of severe accident consequences,
the perception of the public opinion could be different. The con-
cern that the undersea deployment is a way to escape control
(Haratyk et al., 2014) and the fear of an “irreversible” sea conta-
mination could prevent non-experts from appreciating the safety
improvements brought by the submerged SMR concept, thus keep-
ing unchanged or even reducing the level of public acceptance.
6. Conclusions
Submerged SMRs owns unique safety features, which could rep-
resent a great enhancement or a sort of ultimate solution to address
Fukushima-like accident scenarios. The paper has presented the concep-
tual design of IRIS-160, an integral SMR sized to fit and operate in an
immersed hull. The activity has addressed also the definition of reac-
tor design and safety strategy. The IRIS layout has been used as refer-
ence and primary components have been revisited and sized in order
to fit a containment with 14m diameter. Results of preliminary calcula-
tions show that, with a helical SG placed around the barrel, the diame-
ter of the RPV can be lower than 5m. A basic safety strategy has been
defined to face non-LOCA and LOCA accident scenarios, exploiting the
surrounding water as a permanent and constant temperature heat sink.
A simulation of a SBO has been performed with Relap5-Mod3.3, reveal-
ing a good response of the EHRS. In addition, the main challenges that
still need to be addressed for the deployment of submerged SMR have
been identified. Next steps of the investigation will require a more ac-
curate analysis and verification of core design, especially regarding the











M. Santinello, M. Ricotti Progress in Nuclear Energy xxx (2018) xxx-xxx
List of Acronyms
ADS Automatic Depressurization System
CEA Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CHF Critical Heat Flux
CRDM Control Rods Driving Mechanism
DCNS Direction des Constructions Navales Services
DVI Direct Vessel Injection
EHRS Emergency Heat Removal System
HTC Heat Transfer Coefficient
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IRIS International Reactor Innovative and Secure
LOCA Loss Of Coolant Accident
LOOP Loss Of Off-site Power
LPA Lumped Parameter Approach
LUHS Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel
SBO Station Black-Out
SCOR Simple COmpact Reactor
SG Steam Generator
SMR Small Modular Reactor
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